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Abstract
Whether human capital increases or decreases wage uncertainty is an open
question from an empirical standpoint. Yet, most policy prescriptions regarding
human capital formation are based on models that impose riskiness on this type of
investment. In a two period and ﬁnite type optimal income taxation problem we
derive prescriptions that are robust to the risk characteristics of human capital:
savings should be discouraged, human capital investments encouraged and both
types of investment driven to an eﬃcient level from an aggregate perspective.
These prescriptions are also robust to the assumptions regarding what choices are
observed, despite policy instruments being not.
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1 Introduction
The risk characteristics of human capital investment and the properties of optimal
tax policies are intimately linked since, at least, the pioneering work of Eaton and
Rosen (1980).
∗We thank Bev Dahlby, Luis Braido, Humberto Moreira and Daniel Gottlieb for their invaluable
comments. All errors are our own.
†E-mail: cdacosta@fgv.br.
‡E-mail: lmaestri@fgvmail.br
1In a two period representation of life-cycle choices, human capital is assumed to
be risky, and insurance markets for this type of life time risk inexistent. This creates
a role for the government to insure against this purely idiosyncratic risk through tax
instruments.
To isolate the eﬀects of taxation on human capital formation, Eaton and Rosen
(1980) assume that labor supply is inelastic in the second period, thus denying the
possibility of any late adjustments in labor supply. In a later contribution to the subject,
Hamilton (1987) extended the discussion by including–for most of his paper–labor
supply responses after realization of uncertainty, as well.
These papers represent important contributions to our understanding of optimal
policies, despite the fact that most tax prescriptions therein depend on restrictive as-
sumptions on preferences and even, sometimes, on the behavior of endogenous variables.
For our purposes, it is important to highlight some of the main conclusions, though,
as we mentioned, they should not be regarded as general propositions but rather as
results derived for what may be regarded as reasonable cases. They are: i) proportional
taxes are usually superior to lump-sum taxes in what regards its social welfare conse-
quences; governments should ii) encourage human capital and iii) discourage savings.
Underlying all these results is a single driving force: the risky nature of human capital
investment.
Investments in human capital are risky because, at the margin, their return is higher
in the ‘good’ states of nature, when the marginal utility of consumption is lower. Agents
under-invest in human capital formation because, even though, the bulk of the risk in
human capital investment is purely idiosyncratic there are no private markets to insure
against this risk. The government may, in this case, alleviate the problem by both
reducing its riskiness, with a proportional tax, and by directly subsidizing this form of
investment.
But should we take for granted the risky nature of human capital?
From a purely theoretical viewpoint, if human capital returns are higher on the
states of nature where marginal utility of income is lower, then the optimal policy
prescriptions are the opposite of the ones found in the literature, where a speciﬁcation
for human capital technology is used that imposes these risk characteristics.1 The
1This issue has long been recognized in the literature, i.e., Hamilton (1987), p. 380. However, a
2issue of whether education provides or not insurance is closely related to whether it
increases or decreases wage variance and the opposite assumption to the one used in
the literature is just as appealing.
In virtue of all this one needs to recur to the data to try to settle the issue. Unfor-
tunately, there is no conclusive evidence regarding which speciﬁcation best describes
the data.
We shall not explore the empirical literature, referring instead to the discussion in
the introduction of Andersson and Anderberg (2003). We do so not only because we
believe that we could not match the quality of their arguments but also, and more
fundamentally, because the main point of our paper is exactly the fact that the risk
characteristics of human capital is inessential to the qualitative properties of optimal
policy.
We write a model along the lines of Andersson and Anderberg (2003) but allow for
more powerful tax instruments: we consider a fully non-linear tax on labor income and
possibly state dependent taxes on return of savings and human capital.
The problem of optimal policy for human capital investments along the lines of
Mirrlees’ (1971) is a multi-period agency problem that was only starting to be explored
by the time ﬁrst works regarding human capital investments came out. And, even
though agency approaches dealing with the problem are found as early as Ulph and Hare
(1979), risk is altogether eliminated by their collapsing choices in a single period, the
same procedure followed by Brett and Weymark (2000). Uncertainty is also absent in
Boadway and Marchant (1995), who investigate the role of public good provision in the
presence of optimal non-linear income taxation. It was only recently that Maldonado
(2004) and Naito (2004) have introduced dynamic agency to the discussion of human
capital investment problems. They focus, however, on issues that are diﬀerent from
the ones we explore here.
Following Guesnerie (1995), we start with a description of the informational struc-
ture of the economy and derive tax instruments in two steps. First, the revelation
principle is used to determine optimal allocations by means of a truthful revelation di-
rect mechanism. Then, we characterize tax instruments capable of implementing such
allocations.
formal derivation is only found in Andersson and Anderberg (2003).
3As it turns out, fewer restrictions on preferences are needed in our framework for
policy prescriptions to be derived. We are able to show that, if government has full
control over private choices of savings and investment in human capital, savings should
be set below and human capital investments above what would be privately chosen
by agents independently of whether the human capital technology increases or reduces
risk.
To understand what drives our result one must bear in mind the fact that, contrary
to the earlier literature, we model the government optimization as a mechanism design
problem. Risk sharing is taken care of by the non-linear income tax schedule. The
role of other instruments is simply to relax the incentive compatibility constraints. It
is not, then, the risk characteristics of human capital but rather how deviant (or the
anticipation of deviant) behavior aﬀects investment choices that ultimately determines
optimal policies.
Another important characteristic of optimal policies is the prescription of aggregate
eﬃciency for both types of investment: physical and human capital. On the one hand,
agents private choices are distorted, while on the other, aggregate return is determined
by a condition compatible with the prescription of no capital income taxation of Judd
(1985), Chamley (1986) and Lucas (1990).
As for implementation, despite our having no heterogeneity at the time these choices
are made, simple linear taxes or subsidies are not capable of implementing the optimal
allocations. One of the consequences is that education subsidies do not substitute for
compulsory education as one might expect, given ex-ante homogeneity among agents.
With regards to savings, the optimal policy is even harder to interpret since the govern-
ment must induce lower savings. We then characterize implementation via taxes both
for savings and human capital investments. Marginal tax rates are shown to depend
on second period labor output, i.e., marginal taxes for both type of investments are
stochastic and dependent on labor output.2
Implementation thus requires the use of instruments that are not currently observed
and/or depend on apparently extreme assumptions on observability of choices. To
overcome this caveat we relax the assumptions on the controllability of savings and
2This result on taxation of savings was ﬁrst derived, to the best of our knowledge, by Albanesi and
Sleet (2003) in a somewhat similar environment.
4human capital investment by the government, letting these choices be aﬀected only by
simple linear taxes or subsidies.
Encouragement of education and discouragement of savings still obtains albeit with
slightly diﬀerent meaning. If the government policy is towards either savings or human
capital formation but not both at the same time, then it is optimal to tax savings
or subsidize education. When both instruments are used, the signs of tax rates are
ambiguous, though the formulae resemble the encouragement/discouragement expres-
sions derived in Mirrlees (1976): savings ought to be ‘approximately discouraged’ and
human capital formation ‘approximately encouraged’, in a sense to be made precise in
the main text.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 described the model
economy discussing the competitive equilibrium and the properties of the ﬁrst best
optimum–sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. Section 3 describes optimal taxation in
a world where government has complete control of agents’ investment choices, both in
human capital and in a risk free technology. Implementation is discussed in section
4, where the tax systems that are needed to implement the allocations in section 3
are shown to be very far from what is currently observed. In section 5 we consider a
more sensible assumption on observability of savings and human capital formation that
means that the government may inﬂuence these choices but cannot exert direct control
over them. In section 6 an intermediate case is explored. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Economy
The economy, based on Hamilton(1987), is populated by an atomistic measure of











where, c1 and c2 are consumptions in ﬁrst and second periods, respectively, and l is
second period labor supply. Labor supply in the ﬁrst period is the diﬀerence between the
endowment of time– normalized to 1–and the time spent in human capital formation,
h. We assume u and ζ to be smooth functions such that u′ > 0,u′′ < 0, ζ′ > 0, ζ′′ < 0
limcց0 u′(c) = ∞ and limlր1 ζ′(l) = ∞.
5Labor supply, or eﬀort, produces eﬃciency units Y according to the relation Y = wl,
where w is the agents productivity. We abstract from leisure choices in the ﬁrst period
and assume that an agent in endowed with one eﬃciency unit that may be sold to
ﬁrms or used in producing human capital h. We follow Eaton and Rosen (1980) and
Hamilton (1987) in considering foregone earnings as the only costs of this type of
investment. Including other costs would add notational burden and would not provide
new insights to the problem.
Productivity is a function of human capital investment h and ‘talent‘ θ. Uncertainty
arises in this economy because, when still young, agents do not know their innate
talent θ. That is, an agent who dedicates h units of time in the ﬁrst period to human
capital formation, will have productivity w(h,θi) eﬃciency units of labor in period
two if her talent turns out to be θi. Here we take w to be a diﬀerentiable, strictly
increasing (in the two arguments) and strictly concave function with w(0,θ) = 0 and
limhց0 ∂w(h,θ)/∂h = ∞ for all θ.
Once uncertainty is realized, talent is only privately observed. The distribution
function of talent, however, is common knowledge.
Firms transform eﬃciency units into consumption goods using a linear technology
with units normalized in such a way that one eﬃciency unit produces one unit of
consumption. Because they cannot observe l or w work contracts are deﬁne in terms
of eﬃciency units Y = wl which are observed.
The economy is competitive in the usual sense. Agents take prices–wages and
interest rates–when making their choices in both periods. The zero proﬁt condition
for ﬁrms implies that one eﬃciency unit is paid its marginal product. Also important is
the fact that ﬁrms compete for workers in every period, and that agents cannot commit
to working for the same ﬁrm for the two periods. Given the life-cycle nature of our
model such form of commitment do not seem like a good description of actual labor
markets.3 This assumption precludes insurance contracts between ﬁrms and workers
and introduces a role for optimal taxation.
Before writing the agents problem we add to the model the fact that in period 1
they need not consume their income, 1 − h. Borrowing and lending, denoted with s
3Golosov and Tsyvinsky (2003) deﬁne a competitive equilibrium where these long term contracts
are possible. Our model is a representation of life-cycle choices for which this type of commitment
doesn’t seem to be a good representation of actual labor contracts.
6(positive if lending and negative if borrowing), is possible at a gross interest rate of
1. This assumption of capital market eﬃciency is not made for sake of realism, but
to focus on the role of risk properties of human capital in policy design.4 As we shall
see this type of market failure should aggravate the problem and make our case even
stronger.
Hence, absent taxes, the budget constraints for the agents is
c1 ≤ 1 − h − s,
in the ﬁrst period, and
ci ≤ liw(h,θi) + s,
in the second period, state of nature i. Here the superscript i in li denotes the fact that
labor supply is state contingent–it is only decided after the realization of uncertainty.
One should not, however, view second period labor supply responses as simple
variation in hours which, as pointed out by Eaton and Rosen (1980), seems not to be
very responsive to changes in real after tax wages. Rather, this accounts for adjustments
in long term labor/leisure choices after an individual has fully realized her earnings
capacity.
In what follows, we shall assume that there are only two states of the world, H and
L with θH > θL. We also adopt the ‘law of large numbers convention’ that shocks are
independent and identically distributed, and that the number of individuals composing
the population is suﬃciently large to eliminate aggregate uncertainty. Finally, and
just for notational convenience, we assume that types are in equal proportion in this
economy.
2.1 The No-intervention Equilibrium
In this section we consider a no-intervention regime, leaving for the next section the
case of a benevolent government which will use the instruments available to increase
expected utility.
Following the description of the economy in section 2, the timing of the model is as
follows. In the ﬁrst period, every worker decides how to split her time between work
4A very interesting discussion of the role of optimal taxation in a market where the absence of
collateral impedes the ﬁnancing of education is found in Hoﬀ and Lyon (1995).
7and investment in human capital formation. She is paid the total eﬃciency units she
supplies, 1−h, and chooses the ﬁrst period consumption and, consequently, her savings,
s which may be negative.
In the second period, conditional on the variables chosen in the ﬁrst period and on
her type (now revealed), she has to choose how many eﬃciency units, Y (h,s,θ), to
supply.
As is usual we solve agents optimization problem backwards. That is, we start by















, i = H,L (1)
and then solving the ﬁrst period optimal choices,
max
s,h









The ﬁrst order conditions, which under our assumptions are necessary and suﬃcient
for a maximum, yield,
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where wh(h,θi) ≡ ∂w(h,θi)/∂h.




= u′(cH)lHwh(h,θH) + u′(cL)lLwh(h,θL)
dividing both sides by u′  
cH 
+ u′  
cL 
we have,




where πi is the risk-adjusted probability of state i. On the right hand side of the
expression above we have the marginal beneﬁt of the investment in human capital
formation in terms of eﬃcient units. For suﬃciently low labor supply elasticities there is
under-investment (over-investment) if whθ(h,θ) > 0 (whθ(h,θ) > 0), where whθ(h,θ) ≡
∂2w(h,θH)/∂h∂θ.
8In Eaton and Rosen (1980) and Hamilton (1987) education yields higher returns
on the states of nature where people are more productive.5 Because human capital
returns is higher when the marginal utility of income were lower it is a risky asset.
Individuals demand a risk premium to carry the risky-asset: education. From an
aggregate perspective, however, there is no risk but from an individual perspective,
because there are no markets to insure against uncertainty in productivity, investment
in human capital is risky. A taxation policy that could distort relative prices to beneﬁt
investment in human capital would raise social welfare. In particular, at no taxation,
introducing a small subsidy on education is welfare improving since this reduces under-
investment.
Recently, Andersson and Anderberg (2003) have shown that the results in Eaton
and Rosen (1980) and Hamilton (1987) crucially depend on the fact that education is
risky, which in turn depends on the sign of the cross derivatives and elasticity of labor
supply. The problem is that, education might as well decrease wage variance and, hence,
people would over-invest in this asset for insurance purposes. Whichever assumption
is more realistic is an empirical matter. In what concerns tax prescriptions, one may
not know whether education ought to be subsidized or taxed without conﬁdence on the
empirical measurements.
As we shall see, our results do not depend on any of these issues. Before, however,
we spell out the ﬁrst best solution which will provide some other important grounds
for comparing the prescriptions we shall derive.
2.2 First Best Allocations
The purpose of this section is to provide a benchmark against which some results
in other sections may be compared.


























1 − h − c1 
[ λ ]
5They use a speciﬁcation that guarantees ∂
2w/∂h∂θ > 0 and impose conditions-or impose directly-
that guarantee that labor supply is inelastic.




wi(h,θi) = ζ′  
li 
, (2)
consumption smoothing across time and states of nature,
u′  
c1 
= u′  
cH 
= u′  
cL 
, (3)








The last expression, i.e. the optimality condition for human capital investment,
illustrates the fact that the marginal gain from an extra unit of time spent in enhancing
human capital–as measured by the right hand side of (4)–is simply the expected
increase in the output at the social optimum level of labor supply.
This condition is important because, throughout the paper, over and under invest-
ment is always a statement of how the particular value compares to the one determined
in (4).
Notice also that a ﬁrst best allocation requires equating marginal utility of income
in both states of nature, as shown in (3). It also means that more productive agents
work more–as shown in (2)–thus having a lower utility than less productive agents.
This naturally means that if information about productivity is private–as is as-
sumed throughout the paper–the ﬁrst best allocation is not be implementable. Agents
who turn out to be more productive just announce to be less productive and get more
utility then what they get if they announce truthfully.
3 Optimal Taxation
In this section, we assume that the government can fully control all the investment
choices made by the agents, that including investments in human capital and savings
decisions. In the next sections we discuss what this assumption implies for tax in-
struments and the consequences of restricting the set of instruments available to the
government.
6The linear speciﬁcation makes the optimality condition for investment in physical capital innocuous.
10Though the government can directly choose h and s, the ﬁrst best allocation is still
unfeasible, since only eﬃciency units–the traded objects–and not hours supplied are
observed.
We write the mechanism design problem faced by the government and interpret it
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We shall concentrate on two issues in particular: the second best choices of savings
and investment in human capital.
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. (5)




if and only if cH > cL. But this
is exactly the case as one can show by usual single-crossing arguments. This result is
reminiscent of Cremer and Gahvari (1995), da Costa and Werning (2000) and Golosov
et al. (2003).




















where li (i = H,L) is the labor supply of agent type i and lL|H ≡ Y L/w(h,θH) is the
labor supply of a high type agents who announces to be of a low type.
The ﬁrst term in the left hand side is simply the private marginal beneﬁt of educa-
tion given by the decrease in marginal expected eﬀort conditional on a given level of
required eﬃciency units per type. The second term is the marginal cost. Absent any
government policy this would be equal to 0.
11The right hand side is, in general, diﬀerent from 0. In fact, because lL|H < lL and










lL < 2u′  
c1 
. (7)
The government creates a wedge between private marginal costs and beneﬁts of
investment in human capital proportional to the diﬀerence between the marginal beneﬁt
of this form of investment for high productivity agents who announce truthfully and
those who lie. Choices are thus distorted in the direction of hurting oﬀ-equilibrium
behavior.



















lL −  ζ′(lL|H)lL|H = λY L (9)















which is exactly (4). The distortion on private investment choices does not translate
into aggregate ineﬃciency.
Contrary to the competitive equilibrium where the uncertainty on the returns of
education leads to a level of investment in human capital formation that is generally
non-optimal from an aggregate perspective, here, the level chosen by the government
equates aggregate marginal costs and beneﬁts of education.7
4 Implementation
As we have seen, the government distorts choices of savings and human capital in-
vestment, inducing–from a private perspective–under-savings and an over-investment
7The optimal level of h need not coincide with the ﬁrst best one since labor supply diﬀers, in general.
12in human capital formation. How does this wedge translate into government policies?
This is the question we aim at answering along this section.
4.1 Compulsory Choices and Taxation
If government can force agents to choose speciﬁc levels of schooling and savings
then the answer to our problem is trivial. With regards to schooling this implies
that schooling is compulsory at the optimal level. In practice, compulsory education
usually means compelling that a certain amount of time is spent in ’school’, but other
dimensions of education such as eﬀort may not be enforceable.8
For savings, the story is a little diﬀerent because the government must induce
under-savings. This idea is at odds with most policies adopted in modern economies:
it implies that government should forbid people to save!
This motivates the investigation of tax policies for inducing the optimal behav-
ior. for inducing this behavior Because we have no heterogeneity at the moment
where agents make their investment choices, a natural candidate policy is a linear
tax on investment returns. In fact, a single tax is able to guarantee that u′  
c1 
=
E [u′ (c∗)](1 − τ), where c1 and c∗ are the equilibrium consumptions in ﬁrst and second
periods, respectively.
It turns out, however, that this is not enough. One has to be concerned with
what is known as a double deviation as shown in Albanesi and Sleet (2003)–see also
Kocherlakota (2004) and da Costa (2004). Agents, anticipating the fact that they will
lie about their productivities in the second period, choose a level of savings compatible
with these oﬀ-equilibrium choices.
The tax system must guarantee that the equilibrium savings choice is optimal not
only along the equilibrium path but also oﬀ-equilibrium.
In 4.2 we show how both optimal savings and optimal human capital choices may
be implemented with taxes. As we shall make clear, these will be dependent on second
period choices and will diﬀer across agents. The observation of individual savings
choices is crucial here. In section 5 we relax this observability assumption and show
what the consequences are for optimal policies.
8We thank Bev Dahlby for pointing this practical restriction on compulsory education. Da Costa
(2004) discusses the same issue regarding savings.
134.2 Implementation via Taxes
We consider a tax schedule that is (possibly) dependent not only on the level of
savings but also on investment in human capital and on an agents announcement. We
discuss in some detail whether one can dispense with any of these features.9
The ﬁrst thing we note is that, because one is allowing for fully non-linear taxes one
cannot map wedges into taxes. For savings to be identical for liars and abiders–and
this is what ’controlling savings’ is all about–the marginal tax rates must be such that




(1 − τs (s,h,H)) + u′  
cL 
(1 − τs (s,h,L)) (10)




(1 − τs (s,h,L)). (11)
Because u′  
cH 
< u′  
cL 
, (10) and (11) can only hold simultaneously if τs (s,h,H) <
τs (s,h,L)–marginal taxes on savings must be state dependent. Tax schedules must
be non-separable between savings and announcements. Moreover, (10) and (11) imply
that E [u′ (c)τs ( )] > 0. But, because u′ and τs are co-monotonic, E [u′ (c)τs ( )] > 0
need not imply E [τs ( )] > 0.
The same is true with respect to human capital formation, though interpretation is
a little harder here.
Implicit in our formulation is a tax schedule of the following kind. An agent chooses
in period one a certain level of human capital investment, h. Then, in the second period,
conditional on her announcement, and her savings, she pays a tax τ (s,h,Y ). Her ﬁrst














τh (s,h,H)u′  
cH 
+ τh (s,h,L)u′  
cL  
, (12)
9The discussion on savings draws heavily on Albanesi and Sleet (2003), Golosov and Tsyvinsky
(2003), Kocherlakota (2003) and Kocherlakota (2004).
14if she plans to announce truthfully, and













− 2τh (s,h,L)u′  
cL 
, (13)
if she intends to lie.












= τh (s,h,H)u′  
cH 
− τh (s,h,L)u′  
cL 
The left hand side is positive. It must also be the case that
τh (s,h,H)u′  
cH 
+ τh (s,h,L)u′  
cL 
< 0 (14)
for (7) to be satisﬁed. Which means that τh (s,h,L) < 0.
It is usually argued that because human capital is a risky asset agents under-invest
on it. Government’s role, it is said is to induce more investment since, in the aggregate,
there is no risk.
Paradoxically, taxes here may induce more risk since marginal tax rates may be
lower for more productive agents. The point we stress here is that what drives the
prescription is the fact that under-investment is more severe for agents who intend to
deviate from optimal behavior than for those who comply.
Although we are not able to sign the taxes on the so-called empirical measure, we
are able to sign taxes on the risk-neutral measure. Direct observation of 14 and 5
shows that EQ(τs) > 0 and EQ(τh) < 0. The expectation of the tax on savings is
negative and the tax on human capital is positive in the risk-neutral measure. This
result, apparently strange, can be well understood once we realize that the people
weight diﬀerently the states of nature when making their portfolio decisions.
The fact that results obtained thus far depend on tax instruments that do not
resemble the ones veriﬁed in most current policies may be regarded in two diﬀerent
ways. First, one may just say that instruments currently in use are not optimal. Second
that our assumptions are not very realistic. In particular, we have been assuming that
the government can observe education and savings. However, observable measures of
human capital formation as years of schooling may be very far from fully capturing
15what is meant by education. In practice, the government may be restricted to using
simple instruments like linear subsidies or taxes for both types of investment.
What the next section show is that results herein are robust–in a sense to be made
precise–to restrictions in tax instruments associated to this more realistic environment.
5 The Role of Unobserved Choices
In this section we assume that neither savings nor human capital investment is
observed by the government. In this case, we can no longer deﬁne the agency problem
as in the previous section, having to rely, instead, in a procedure that allows for these
unobserved choices.
Let us start however with the second period, and let s∗ and h∗ the equilibrium
choices of savings and human capital, which we will explain in detail, shortly after this.
Then, an allocation that is implemented by a truthful direct mechanism must satisfy










i,j = H,L. (15)
This guarantees that once uncertainty is revealed, no matter what type she turns
out to be, the agent ﬁnds in her best interest to reveal her true type.
Though necessary, conditions (15) does not suﬃce, in this case. Of concern here is
again the double deviation problem. Even if, at the equilibrium levels of savings and
human capital s∗ and h∗ the agent prefers the allocation intended for her, there may
be alternative choices of h and s at which (15) does not hold and that are ex-ante
preferred by the agent.
To deal with this we follow da Costa (2004) by considering that, in the ﬁrst period,
agents conceive contingent plans, or strategies, that prescribe what they ought to an-
nounce as being their productivity if they turn out to be of a certain type. A strategy
is, in this sense, a mapping σ : {H,L} → {H,L} from types to announcements.
This is not all an agent does in the ﬁrst period, however. She also chooses how
much to save, s, and how much to invest in human capital, h. In general this may
result in the problem being very complicated. It turns out, however, that in our setup,
the optimization problem related to savings and human capital investment is strictly
convex conditional on a given strategy. Hence, associated to each strategy σi is a pair





In characterizing the optimal tax schedule we choose allocations that induce the
truthful announcement strategy–which we shall denote with a star–σ∗(j) = j, j =
H,L. The revelation principle guarantees that we can restrict our attention to alloca-
tions that can be implemented by this direct mechanism.
The allocations must be such that the truthful strategy is preferable to the other
strategies allowing for the optimization with respect to h and s. In other words, the
triple (σ∗,s∗,h∗) is better than any of the other three strategies.
Formally, let σo represent an arbitrary alternative strategy. An allocation is imple-
mentable if and




















for all σo, where so and ho are, respectively, the optimal savings and investment corre-
sponding to strategy σo.
There are ﬁve diﬀerent incentive compatibility–henceforth IC–constraints: three
in the ﬁrst period (16) and two in the second (15). What we shall do next is to show
that only one of the ﬁve IC constraints binds at the optimum.
5.1 Some Auxiliary Results
In the next few paragraphs we collect a series of results that will be necessary for
deﬁning the government’s program.
The ﬁrst proposition guarantees that once the ﬁrst period IC constraints (15) are
imposed one need not be concerned about second period IC constraints.
Proposition 1 If constraints (16) are satisﬁed, so are constraints (15).
10If we let #(σ) be the cardinality of the set of strategy we have #(σ) = 2
#(i) , where #(i) is the
cardinality of the set of types. Hence the convenience of keeping down the number of types.
17The intuition for this result is rather simple. Assume that one of the second period
IC constraints is binding. In this case, at the equilibrium level of savings and human
capital investment the agent is indiﬀerent between truthful announcement and adopting
the strategy corresponding to this binding IC constraint. Re-optimizing s and h will
break the indiﬀerence in favor of the alternative strategy thus violating one of the ﬁrst
period IC constraints. As a consequence, if (16) are satisﬁed, so are (15).
Next, we present a lemma that will be needed in most results that follow. It says
that implementable allocations are increasing in types, i.e., then usual monotonicity
requirement extends to our framework.
Lemma 1 For an allocation
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The next result guarantees that the strategy of always announcing falsely–σo (j) =
i, i  = j–cannot be optimal. More precisely, if there is a choice of (s,h) that makes
this strategy better than truthful announcement, then there are also levels of savings
and investment in human capital that make one of the two other alternative strategies
optimal. Therefore, imposing the two IC constraints associated to strategies σo (j) = L
(j = H,L) and σo (j) = H (j = H,L) guarantees that the third is also satisﬁed.
Proposition 2 If the truthful strategy is no worse than strategies σo (j) = L (j = H,L)
and σo (j) = H (j = H,L), then it is no worse than strategy σo (H) = L, σo (L) = H.
We are down to two IC constraints only. We shall now show that the strategy of
always announcing to be of a high productivity type–σo (j) = H, j = H,L–cannot
be optimal, if the tax system is welfare increasing. This will bring us down to only one
relevant IC constraint.
Notice that we rule out this strategy on diﬀerent grounds than the other strategy.
There are implementable allocations for which the relevant IC constraint is associated
to the strategy of always announcing H.
The point here is that, though there might be allocations that are implementable
at which the agents are indiﬀerent between the truthful strategy and the strategy of
always announcing high, these allocations yield a lower expected utility than what an
18agent gets in autarchy. Hence it should not bind at the optimum, given the objective
of the government.
Proposition 3 If the agent is indiﬀerent between always telling the truth and always
announcing H then the implementable allocation must result in a lower expected utility
than what the agents gets in the competitive equilibrium.
To summarize this section, we have shown that, under our assumptions, one needs
only be concerned with one alternative strategy, σo (j) = L; j = H,L, which amounts
to the agent always announcing to be of type L.
We are now in a position to write down the government’s program.
5.2 The Optimal Taxation Problem
The government maximizes the agents’ expected utility subject to the economy’s
resource constraint  
i=H,L
 
Y i − yi 
≥ 0
and, as shown in section 5.1, a single IC constraint























To ﬁnd optimal taxes we write the Lagrangian for the government’s program,








































Y i − yi 
From the ﬁrst order conditions it is immediate that the marginal tax rate of a high
productivity agent is found by exploring
ζ′  
lH 
u′ (s∗ + yH)
= w(h∗,θH).
19Because the marginal rate of substitution between labor supply and consumption
is exactly the price of leisure, the most productive agent is not distorted at the margin.
The zero marginal tax rate result is preserved, here.
As for the low productivity agent, we have
ζ′  
lL 


















λ + 2 u′  
so + yL  −1
The left hand side of this expression is the marginal rate of substitution between yL
and Y L, which is equal to one, there is no distortion. Therefore, we need to evaluate
whether the right hand side of this expression to determine the sign of the marginal
tax rate faced by the low productivity agent.
















u′ (so + yL)w(ho,θH)
  
,
where φ ≡ λ/2u′  
so + yL 
.
The term in brackets is the average marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption for an agent oﬀ the equilibrium path. Hence, the marginal tax rate
faced by a low productivity agent will be positive or negative depending on whether
the average marginal tax rate faced by an agent oﬀ the equilibrium path is positive or
negative.
Though the rule diﬀer from the case where no ﬁrst period unobservable choices are
present, the principle that drives tax prescriptions is the same. The idea is that if one is
at the maximum redistribution that preserves Pareto eﬃciency distorting choices may
be useful in relaxing IC constraints if agents have diﬀerent marginal rates of substitution
between y and Y at this point.
When all choices are controlled by the government, we need only to compare the
low type with the high type announcing to be a low type. Single-crossing is used to
sign the marginal tax rate. Here, what must be considered is the average marginal rate
of substitution of an agent who opts for the strategy of always announcing to be of
type low, with that of a low type at the equilibrium choices of s and h. Unfortunately,
we cannot resort to single-crossing to sign the marginal tax rate.
20To further understand the issues at stake we need to explore oﬀ equilibrium choices,
starting from the next proposition.
Proposition 4 At the optimum, s∗ < so and h∗ > ho.
The intuition for this behavior is rather simple. When deciding to deviate by always
announcing to be of a low productivity type an agent anticipates less income and more
leisure. Under our assumptions on preferences this implies higher marginal utility of
consumption and lower disutility of labor.
A higher marginal utility of income and a lower marginal disutility of labor makes
it optimal to increase consumption and diminish leisure by choosing to save more and
to get less education.
5.3 Educational Policy
In this section we assume that the government can introduce an anonymous tax (or
subsidy) on human capital formation. To model it we write the cost of education in
terms of foregone earnings as (1 + τ)h where τ is the tax on human capital formation.
We diﬀerentiate the Lagrangian with respect to τ at τ = 0 to get
∂L
∂τ
       
τ=0
= −(1 +  )u′ (c∗
1)h∗ +  u′  
c1 
ho + λh∗
= −(1 +  )h∗  
u′  
s∗ + yH 
+ u′  
s∗ + yL  
+ 2 u′  
so + yL 
ho + λh∗
= 2 u′  
so + yL 
(ho − h∗) < 0. (17)
where in the last step the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to yH and yL were used.
This shows that, around τ = 0, it is optimal to reduce taxes on (thus subsidizing)
human capital formation. Eaton and Rosen (1980) and Hamilton (1987) derive an
analogous result for taxation on wages based on assumptions which are a little more
restrictive. In particular, it is worth pointing out that their result has a diﬀerent
interpretation. They show that a small tax rate on wage (equivalently a small subsidy
on education) is welfare increasing because it provides insurance to the uncertainty
present on the educational returns. We, on the other hand, show that in an optimized
economy this follows because taxing wages, or ﬁnancing education, one can relax the
incentive-compatibility constraint.
21This result has a straightforward interpretation. From proposition 4 one can see
that those who choose to cheat decide to work more on the ﬁrst period and to get
less education, since this strategy contemplates always announcing to be lower type.
Hence, by subsidizing education the government can hurt more those who in the second
period decide to lie about their types.
5.3.1 Optimal Taxes
At τ  = 0 things are not so straightforward. The problem here is that one can no
longer guarantee which IC constraint binds at the optimum for arbitrary values of τ.
Yet, we can still show that, if the binding IC constraint is the natural one, then it is
optimal to subsidize education.11




Y i − yi 
+ 2τh ≥ 0
and equation (17) becomes
∂L
∂τ
= 2 u′  
so + yL 
























= 0 ⇒ τ < 0,
which means that optimal tax on education is negative: the policy prescription is to
subsidize education.
In our model there is no credit rationing nor externalities in the educational invest-
ment. Yet, we conclude that the optimal tax rate on education should be negative. This
11Da Costa (2004) oﬀers some arguments as of why we should expect this to be the case for any
reasonable parametrization of the model.
12This extra term results from the fact that the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to y
i (i = H,L)
have now an extra term, λτ∂h/∂y
i, that must be considered when proceeding with the same substitu-
tions that were used in the previous section.
22is not directly due to the fact that there is wage uncertainty in our model. Instead, wage
uncertainty makes necessary an optimal taxation mechanism to redistribute wealth.
5.4 Taxing Investments
Deﬁning now, t as the tax on investments, an analogous procedure to the one used
in section 5.3 yields
∂L
∂t
       
t=0




u′(s∗ + yi)s∗ −  2u′(so + yL)so 
+ λs∗
=  2u′(so + yL)[so − s∗] > 0.
Once again we have the result that, around t = 0, it is optimal to increase taxes on
(thus taxing) returns on investments.
5.4.1 Optimal Taxes
The case here is exactly analogous to the case studied in section 5.3.1. Once again
assuming that the relevant IC constraint is the one that guarantees that it is not optimal
to always announce L we may show that it is optimal to tax savings.
5.5 Discussion
What we see form this section is that even if the government cannot directly control
savings and investment in human capital, it is still the case that it should intervene in
the market by taking savings and subsidizing education.
Notice also that we have not considered the two instruments together. The problem
here is that the cross eﬀects of taxation on the two investment choices aﬀect the sign
of tax instruments.
Yet, it is possible to show that under the same conditions of the last two sections
we have, τˆ hτ +tˆ sτ > 0 and τˆ ht +tˆ st < 0, where variables with hats are ’compensated’
choices.13




h measures the eﬀect on savings of increasing taxes on human capital
investment when this change is compensated with an increase of h units of income in each state of the
world.
23We would want to interpret the two expressions as a statement about the encour-
agement of human capital investment and a discouragement of savings along the lines
of Mirrlees (1976), however the association is not precise. The problem here is that
though ˆ s and ˆ h are ’compensated’ savings and human capital investment, they need
not be symmetric, i.e., ˆ sτ  = ˆ ht, in general.
Hamilton (1987) is able to show that an interest income tax is optimal under fairly
restrictive assumption: inelastic labor supply and no savings. We analyze the same
question setting up a mechanism design problem, what allows us to give more policy
prescriptions under more general assumptions.
The general rule present in the literature prescribes zero tax rate on capital, see
for example, Feldstein (1978) in a two-periods model and Chamley (1987) and Lucas
(1990) in a Ramsey framework. Our result contradicts these prescriptions. In a diﬀerent
framework, we ﬁnd a result analogous to the one derived by Kocherlakota et. al. (2003).
6 Observable Education and Unobservable Savings
In this section we assume that the government can still control education but cannot
control savings. There is an inconsistency in assuming this type of observability, given
that observing one implies observing the other from the fact that labor supply–in
terms of eﬃciency units–is observe and 1−h−s is observed. This is of course due to
our simplifying assumptions regarding ﬁrst period choices.
We set this aside and solve the government’s program
max
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Y H + Y L ≥ yH + yL, [ λ ]
where Lagrange multipliers are shown at the right of each constraint equation.
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− u′(so + yL)
 
(18)
which parallels the one found in section 5. The diﬀerence is that human capital invest-
ments are controlled in (18), hence equal on and oﬀ the equilibrium path whilst in they
diﬀer, in general.
High productivity agents will necessarily consume more–(Y H,yH) >> (Y L,yL).
The diﬀerences in marginal utilities will be proportional to u′(so + yL), the marginal









The marginal cost will be higher for the least productive.
So, the interpretation for the equation that determines the optimal quantity of
education parallels that of section 3. Once again, a wedge between marginal cost and
marginal beneﬁt of education is induced by the government.
Equation (18) resembles (9). When choosing the optimal amount of education
the government should equalize its private cost, the foregone earnings, to its private
25beneﬁt, the reduction in marginal cost of eﬀort, plus one term relative to the incentive
compatibility constraint. Noticing that Y H > Y L one can easily see that this expression
should be positive. Hence, we have the same situation as before: the government should
distort the level of education to punish the deviators.
6.1 Taxing Investments
Assume that the government can tax savings as in section 5. In this case,
∂L
∂t











The same procedure used in section 5 applies here. First we notice that
∂L
∂t




















Hence, we only need to know the sign of (so − s∗) to determine the sign of t.
But optimal savings on and oﬀ-equilibrium, s∗ and so, can be determined by the
following private ﬁrst order conditions:




u′(s∗ + yH) + u′(s∗ + yL)
 
u′(1 − h −so) = u′(so + yL)
Hence, so > s∗. This shows that the optimal linear tax rates on savings are positive.
Finally, notice that an increase in h reduces savings (on and oﬀ the equilibrium
path) hence reducing tax revenues. This indirect eﬀect must be accounted for by the
government when deciding the optimal level of h. It does not change, however the
qualitative results.
6.1.1 Observable Savings and Unobservable Education
When the government observes only savings, the same procedure may be used to
show that the government should choose a lower level of savings than what the agent
would ﬁnd optimal. We omit the algebra, since this derivation is absolutely analogous
to the case analyzed above.
26The reason for introducing this wedge between marginal cost and marginal gains for
savings is the same as before. By reducing savings the government makes life tougher
for those who adopt the strategy of announcing falsely their types, when compared
to the eﬀect on those who intend to comply. Lower savings is useful for relaxing the
incentive compatibility constraints, in this case.
Also, if we allow the government to set a linear tax on the investment in education,
one can show that the tax rate should be negative: education ought to be subsidized.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed a model of human capital formation with wage
uncertainty due to idiosyncratic shocks to productivity along the lines of Eaton and
Rosen (1980) and Hamilton (1987).
Our model diﬀers from these early contributions to the literature in two dimensions.
First, we generalize the human capital investment technology by letting human capital
increase or decrease wage variance. Second, we allow the government to use a fully
non-linear income tax schedule.
Contrary to the rest of the literature the prescriptions we derive are robust to the
risk characteristics of human capital: government should encourage education and dis-
courage savings. Robustness is due to our prescriptions being driven by reasons that
are diﬀerent from the usual ones. The government should ﬁnance education and tax
savings to punish those who want to deviate and free-ride on the government’s redis-
tributive programs, claiming to be less productive than they really are. Because the
pattern of choices driven by deviant behavior is independent of the risk characteristics
of human capital investment, so are policy prescriptions.
Finally, we have built a bridge between diﬀerent ways to analyze the same problem
based on diﬀerent informational structures and have shown another dimension of ro-
bustness of our results: they are also robust to diﬀerent assumptions on observability
of investment choices.
Wedges between marginal private costs and beneﬁts are created with instruments
that are feasible according to the informational structure of the problem. Signs of
wedges are invariant to these informational changes.
27A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Because IC constraints (16) are satisﬁed we have





























where the last inequality is due to so and ho being the optimal choices for alternative
strategy o.





























Therefore, one of the second period IC constraints is satisﬁed. To prove that the other
is also satisﬁed we only need to consider the other alternative strategy σo (j) = H,
j = H,L. An analogous procedure delivers the result.
Proof of Lemma 1. For notational simplicity, in this proof, we normalize













































































28Hence, the allocation is not implementable.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let so and ho be the optimum level of savings and
human capital investments for the strategy σo such that σo (H) = L and σo (L) = H.
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where the last inequality is due to (s∗,h∗) being optimal for the true-telling strategy.
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume ﬁrst that the optimal allocation is such that
Y H < yH and Y L > yL. Then for any s and h the allocation is a mean preserving
spread over the allocation obtained by choosing s and h and producing Y H and Y L
depending on the state of nature. Because agents are risk averse utility is lower in the
ﬁrst case.
Next consider Y H ≥ yH and Y L ≤ yL. If the constraint in binding, the expected utility
delivered by the optimal tax scheme is
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with strict inequality if Y H > yH. But, if Y H = yH the allocation is feasible in autarchy
and, in general, non-optimal, hence governments policy lowers utility, when compared
to what can be attained in autarchy.
29Proof of Proposition 4. Fix s∗ and so and assume that h∗ ≤ ho. The ﬁrst order
conditions for savings are
2u′ (1 − s∗ − h∗) = u′  
yH + s∗ 
+ u′  
yL + s∗ 
(19)
and
u′ (1 − so − ho) = u′  
yL + so 
(20)
with yL < yH. While the ﬁrst order conditions for human capital investments imply,

































































 ∗ ≡ ∂w(h∗,θH)/∂h and
 
∂wH/∂h
 o ≡ ∂w(ho,θH)/∂h.
The two equalities–which begin and end the expression–are simply the ﬁrst order
conditions with respect to h along and oﬀ the equilibrium path. The second inequality
is a simple consequence of Y L < Y H. As for the ﬁrst, it is due to the facts that: i)
h∗ ≤ ho ⇒ w(h∗,θ) < w(ho,θ) (monotonicity) and (∂w/∂h)
o < (∂w/∂h)
∗ (concavity),
and ii) convexity and monotonicity of ζ ( ).
Hence, u′ (1 − s∗ − h∗) ≥ u′ (1 − so − ho) for any s, h∗ ≤ ho which is not compatible
with (19) and (20).
As for savings, assume s∗ > so. Then,
u′  






yH + s∗ 
+ u′  
yL + s∗  
= u′ (1 − s∗ − h∗) > u′ (1 − so − ho).
where the last inequality is due to h∗ > ho. This contradicts so and ho satisfying the
ﬁrst order conditions.
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